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C O M M E N T  
When Stopping the Smuggler Means Repelling the 
Refugee: International Human Rights Law and the 
European Union’s Operation To Combat Smuggling 
in Libya’s Territorial Sea 
Over the past three years, the number of human tragedies on the Mediterra-
nean Sea has reached an unprecedented level.
1
 The now-iconic image of a Ger-
man rescue worker cradling a drowned migrant baby in his arms in the sea be-
tween Libya and Italy remains a disturbing reminder of the over 5,000 migrants 
and refugees who died attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2016 alone.
2
 Of 
the European Union’s (EU) responses to this humanitarian crisis, perhaps the 
most controversial has been Operation Sophia: a naval mission to combat hu-
man smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean, in particular off 
the coast of Libya.
3
 As part of Operation Sophia, the EU is now supporting and 
training the Libyan Navy and Coastguard to combat smuggling and stop mi-
grant departures within Libya’s territorial sea—waters within twelve nautical 
 
1. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘Worst Annual Death Toll Ever’: Mediterranean Claims 5,000 Mi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world/europe 
/migrant-death-toll-mediterranean-europe.html [http://perma.cc/QNY4-WJ4H]; Gaia Pia-
nigiani & Delcan Walsh, Can E.U. Shift Migrant Crisis to the Source? In Libya, the Odds Are 
Long, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/world/europe/can 
-eu-shift-migrant-crisis-to-the-source-in-libya-the-odds-are-long.html [http://perma.cc
/AR9S-7JFZ]; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Mediterranean Death Toll Soars, 2016 Is Dead-
liest Year Yet (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/10/580f3e684
/mediterranean-death-toll-soars-2016-deadliest-year.html [http://perma.cc/QT29 
-7DRC]. 
2. Cumming-Bruce, supra note 1; Steve Scherer, Drowned Baby Picture Captures Week of Tragedy 
in Mediterranean, REUTERS (May 30, 2016, 5:10 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article
/us-europe-migrants-baby-iduskcn0yl18p [http://perma.cc/BQ5B-M24M]. 
3. Pianigiani & Walsh, supra note 1. 
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miles of Libya’s nautical baseline. The EU simultaneously continues to seek per-
mission for European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) 
vessels and personnel themselves to enter Libya’s territorial sea to seize and dis-
pose of smuggling vessels. (These two components will hereinafter together be 
referred to as the Operation Sophia “territorial sea component.”) 
The EU’s goal of decreasing the number of migrants
4
 who reach the Medi-
terranean high seas is understandable, but the territorial sea component presents 
serious human rights concerns. Instead of traversing the high seas to possibly 
reach Europe and asylum, migrants will be turned back by the Libyan Coast-
guard—trained and supported by EUNAVFOR MED—to a country where they 
likely face prolonged detention, brutality, and persecution. There is also the pos-
sibility that migrants and refugees will be caught in the crossﬁre between the 
human smugglers and the Libyan Coastguard in collaboration with 
EUNAVFOR MED. This Comment considers whether the EU’s activities in the 
territorial sea of Libya will occur within the framework of international human 
rights law, or whether there are gaps in protection for migrants impacted by the 
Operation. 
While the EU heralds the Operation Sophia territorial sea component as a 
humanitarian endeavor, this Comment urges caution. This Comment argues 
that the design of the territorial sea component exploits gaps in the human rights 
accountability framework while contributing to a concerning norm of milita-
rized extraterritorial border control. The Comment speciﬁcally demonstrates 
how in collaborating with the Libyan Coastguard, European states operate in a 
legal grey area where the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) may not extend, and thus the application of human rights law is un-
certain. Through this analysis, the Comment reveals how Operation Sophia in-
stantiates a policy of non-entrée. Non-entrée is a notion in human rights scholar-
ship describing responses to migration that allow states to purport to be 
consistent with human rights law—but only by preventing situations in which 
the state’s human rights obligations might formally apply.
5
 
The Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces Operation Sophia 
and the human rights issues implicated by the territorial sea component. Part II 
discusses the difficulty in establishing human rights jurisdiction under European 
human rights law for the Operation Sophia territorial seas component. It iden-
 
4. In this Comment, the term “migrant” is used inclusively. A migrant may be a refugee or asy-
lum seeker, or an individual crossing national borders due to other factors, such as economic 
ones. 
5. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooper-
ative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235 (2015); James C. Hathaway, The Emerging 
Politics of Non-Entrée, 91 REFUGEES 40 (1992). 
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tiﬁes the existence of a human rights protection gap through analysis of the ef-
fective control standard in maritime operations, ECtHR jurisprudence on extra-
territorial military engagements and territorial control, and the ECtHR’s treat-
ment of derived responsibility and joint conduct. Part III then contends that the 
territorial sea component makes signiﬁcant and concerning contributions to an 
emerging norm of militarized, cooperation-based border control. Part IV pro-
poses legal and policy prescriptions. 
i .  operation sophia and human rights on the 
mediterranean sea 
In recent years, observers and scholars have rightly called attention to Euro-
pean states’ heightened implementation of border security protocols and re-
strictions on asylum access in response to the global migration crisis. The term 
“Fortress Europe” is now commonplace.
6
 Over the past twenty years, European 
states have developed this practice by striking deals with African nations to sup-
port maritime interdictions in their territorial seas.
7
 As a military operation de-
signed to limit the number of migrants in reach of Europe’s borders, Operation 
Sophia expressly follows in this trend. This Part provides background infor-
mation on Operation Sophia (Section A) and highlights the human rights con-
cerns at stake in the territorial sea component (Section B). 
 
6. See, e.g., Abdullahi Elmi v. Malta, App. Nos. 25794/13 & 28151/13, ¶ 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 
2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168780 [http://perma.cc/GJ8X-TBGB] (Pinto 
de Albuquerque, J., concurring) (“The human cost of the so-called ‘fortress Europe’ needs no 
scientiﬁc demonstration; it is exposed unsparingly on the daily news.”); Stefan Lehne, The 
Tempting Trap of Fortress Europe, CARNEGIE EUR. (Apr. 21, 2016), http://carnegieeurope.eu
/2016/04/21/tempting-trap-of-fortress-europe-pub-63400 [http://perma.cc/6ACZ 
-WQSF]; Preethl Nallu, Fortress Europe: An Interactive Map of the EU’s Growing List of  
Security Barriers, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry 
/refugees-deeply-fortress-europe_us_570baf69e4b0885fb50d7b25 [http://perma.cc/GA9U 
-HZS8]. 
7. Hanson & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 250; see also Violeta Moreno-Lax, Seeking Asylum in the 
Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member States’ Obligations Accruing at Sea, 
23 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 174, 200-06 (2011) (describing the EU’s cooperation with third coun-
tries to address migration by sea); Samuel Cogolati et al., Migrants in the Mediterranean: Pro-
tecting Human Rights, EUR. PARLIAMENT 27-33 (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/535005/EXPO_STU(2015)535005_EN.pdf [http://
perma.cc/J96B-B2CP] (describing recent EU migration management programs in the Medi-
terranean Sea). 
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A. The Territorial Sea Component in Context 
The territorial sea component is the most recent stage of Operation Sophia, 
which was initiated in the summer of 2015 and constitutes one of the three EU 
Operations currently ongoing in the Mediterranean.
8
 Operation Sophia’s central 
objective is “the disruption of the business model” of smugglers and human traf-
ﬁckers,
9
 and to “prevent the further loss of life at sea.”
10
 
Phase 1 of Operation Sophia, completed in 2015, involved surveillance of mi-
gration routes and smuggling activities to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
smuggling business.
11
 Phase 2A is currently underway and involves seizing and 
diverting vessels suspected of smuggling on the high seas.
12
 On the high seas, 
EUNAVFOR MED is authorized to use force both in its engagements with sus-
pected smugglers and in order to “dispose” of (i.e., destroy) vessels identiﬁed as 
in use, or likely to be in use, for smuggling.
13
 The United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) authorized Phase 2A in October 2015 in Resolution 2240, under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and has since extended authorization until Oc-
tober 2017.
14
 Resolution 2240 is the ﬁrst UNSC authorization of high seas inter-




8. EU Operations in the Mediterranean, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://
eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ﬁles/5_euoperationsinmed_2pg.pdf [http://perma.cc/NQZ5 
-LD7R]. 
9. Council Decision 2015/778, art. 1, 2015 O.J. (L 122) 31, 32 (EU); see also European Union Naval 
Force—Mediterranean Operation Sophia, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. 1 (Sept. 15, 2016) [here-
inafter EU Naval Force], http://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ﬁles/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en
_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/54JN-R32K] (describing the mission of Operation Sophia). 
10. EU Naval Force, supra note 9, at 1; see also EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA—Six Monthly Re-
port, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. 11-12 (Nov. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Operation Sophia Six-
Monthly Report (Nov. 2016)], http://statewatch.org/news/2016/dec/eu-council-eunavformed
-jan-oct-2016-report-restricted.pdf [http://perma.cc/B28T-9PFB]. 
11. EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA—Six Monthly Report, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV. 9 (Jan. 
28, 2016) [hereinafter Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Jan. 2016)], http://wikileaks.org
/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/A7QC-ZYJY]. 
12. S.C. Res. 2240 (Oct. 9, 2015); Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Jan. 2016), supra note 11, 
at 10. “High seas” in the context of the Operation Sophia authorization refers to waters be-
yond Libya’s 12-mile territorial sea. See Brian Wilson, The Mediterranean Migrant Crisis: Key 
Considerations for the UN Security Council, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (Oct. 9, 2015), http:// 
harvardnsj.org/2015/10/mediterranean-migrant-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/48KG-WMHQ]. 
This could include areas Libya considers part of its exclusive economic zone. 
13. See S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 12, ¶ 8. 
14. S.C. Res. 2312 (Oct. 6, 2016) ¶ 7; S.C. Res. 2240, supra note 12, ¶ 8. 
15. Efthymios Papastavridis, EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia and the International Law of the Sea, 2 
MAR. & SECURITY L.J. 57, 63-64 (2016). 
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Resolution “urges” states to comply with international human rights obliga-
tions, although commentators have emphasized that the text does not provide 
for substantive mechanisms to achieve this end.
16
 
Phase 2B of Operation Sophia will allow EUNAVFOR MED to enter Libya’s 
territorial sea to board, seize, divert, and potentially destroy vessels suspected of 
smuggling in that maritime zone. “Phase 2B” will only begin with a UNSC Res-
olution and official invitation by the Libyan Government.
17
 While at the time of 
writing, these steps have not yet occurred, EUNAVFOR MED aims to proceed 
to this stage.
18
 As the EU awaits Libya’s invitation, the EU has effectively ex-
tended Operation Sophia into Libya’s territorial sea through a program of train-
ing and funding the Libyan Coastguard beginning in the summer of 2016. On 
June 20, 2016, the Council of the European Union expanded the Operation’s 
mandate to include capacity-building and training of the Libyan Coastguard and 
Navy, as well as information sharing with them.
19
 
By training the Libyan Coastguard, EUNAVFOR MED aims to enhance the 
Libyan Coastguard’s own ability to disrupt smuggling in the Libyan territorial 
sea and enhance their search-and-rescue capacity.
20
 While European states have 
previously funded African states to support maritime interdictions,
21
 the most 
recent effective agreement with Libya occurred before the Libyan government 
disintegrated in 2011.
22
 At present, the Libyan government lacks control of its 
coastline, and the Libyan Coastguard itself is disorganized, poorly resourced, 
 
16. See, e.g., Douglas Guilfoyle, Transnational Crime and the Rule of Law at Sea, in ‘BOAT REFUGEES’ 
AND MIGRANTS AT SEA: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: INTEGRATING MARITIME SECURITY 
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS 169, 183-85 (Violeta Moreno-Lax & Efthymios Papastavridis eds., 
2016). 
17. Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Nov. 2016), supra note 10, at 22-23. 
18. Id. at 22. 
19. Council Decision 2016/993, 2016 O.J. (L 162) 18 (EU); see Press Release 161027_11, Eur. Un-
ion, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia Starts Training of Libyan Navy Coast Guard and 
Libyan Navy (Oct. 27, 2016), http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/drugs/13195/eunavfor-med 
-operation-sophia-starts-training-of-libyan-navy-coast-guard-and-libyan-navy_en [http://
perma.cc/K4DV-BLH9]. 
20. See Press Release 160823_01, Delegation of the Eur. Union to Cent. Afr. Rep., EUNAVFOR 
Med Operation Sophia Signs Agreement To Train Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (Aug. 23, 
2016) [hereinafter Press Release, EUNAVFOR Signs Agreement], http://eeas.europa.eu 
/delegations/central-african-republic/8753/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-signs 
-agreement-to-train-libyan-coast-guard-and-navy_en [http://perma.cc/99RS-JT2C]; EU 
Training Libyan Coast Guard To Curb Refugee Flows, EURACTIV (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www
.euractiv.com//med-south/news/eu-training-libyan-coast-guard-to-curb-refugee-ﬂows 
[http://perma.cc/RRE4-MDS4]. 
21. See Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 250; Cogolati et al., supra note 7, at 33. 
22. Pianigiani & Walsh, supra note 1. 
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and retains a poor human rights record.
23
 EUNAVFOR MED’s training of the 
Libyan Navy and Coastguard officially commenced in late October 2016 and oc-
curs on EUNAVFOR MED vessels on the high seas.
24
 The Libyans are trained 
on methods to tackle smuggling and reduce migration, as well as on interna-
tional law and search and rescue.
25
 In January 2017, European states decided to 
begin funding the Libyan Government to engage in antismuggling operations.
26
 
The current training and funding program may signal a transition to Phase 
2B (referring speciﬁcally to the deployment of EUNAVFOR MED officers and 
vessels themselves into Libya’s territorial sea), which is also expected to involve 
close collaboration with the Libyans.
27
 Should Phase 2B proceed, current dis-
course and past practice suggest that EUNAVFOR MED and the Libyan Coast-
guard may engage in operational coordination, including activities such as joint 
patrols and deployment of Libyan officers on European vessels (or vice versa) to 




23. See id.; sources cited infra note 48. 
24. Press Release, EUNAVFOR Signs Agreement, supra note 20. 
25. Nick Buxton & Mark Akkerman, The Deadly Consequences of Europe’s Border Militarization, 
TRUTHOUT (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/38909-the-deadly 
-consequences-of-europe-s-border-militarization [http://perma.cc/7KWJ-AVP2]; Dibie Ike 
Michael, EU Trains Libyan Coast Guard To Curb Migrant Flows, AFR. NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:29 
PM), http://www.africanews.com/2016/10/28/eu-trains-libyan-coast-guard-to-curb 
-migrant-ﬂows [http://perma.cc/675Z-VJ2B]. 
26. EU Hikes Support for Libya Coast Guard To Stop Migrants, BRIETBART LONDON (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.breitbart.com/london/2017/01/25/eu-hikes-support-libya-coast-guard-stop 
-migrants [http://perma.cc/EE9D-JPXZ]; Patrick Wintour, Libya May Allow EU Ships To 
Pursue People-Smugglers in Its Waters, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.theguar 
dian.com/world/2017/feb/01/nato-eu-ships-tackle-people-trafficking-libya-mediterranean 
-refugees-migrants [http://perma.cc/MJ5V-ZB8A]. 
27. Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Nov. 2016), supra note 10, at 3 (noting that “[t]he start 
of training marks a milestone . . . and is . . . crucial for enhancing the ability of moving  
the operation forward into the next phases”); see Niels Frenzen, EUNAVFOR MED-Six 
Month Report: No Indication of Refugee Protection Plan for EU Operations Within Libyan Territo-
rial Waters and No Reports of Human Trafficking, MIGRANTS AT SEA (Feb. 23, 2016, 5:01  
AM), http://migrantsatsea.org/2016/02/23/eunavfor-med-six-month-report-no-indication 
-of-refugee-protection-plan-for-eu-operations-within-libyan-territorial-waters-and-no-rep
orts-of-human-trafficking [http://perma.cc/7THC-2DMF]; Wintour, supra note 26. 
28. See MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM 256-57 (2011); Frenzen, 
supra note 27 (describing the possibility of joint patrols and ship riders in Phase 2B); Chris 
Stephen, Libya Faces Inﬂux of Migrants Seeking New Routes to Europe, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2016, 
4:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/09/libya-inﬂux-migrants 
-europe [http://perma.cc/S3B8-HSVY] (describing a Phase 2B plan in which naval vessels 
operate in pairs, with one turning back migrants and the other employing force against the 
smugglers); see also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶¶ 13, 
19 (describing bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya). 
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In addition to Operation Sophia, the EU continues to patrol the Central 
Mediterranean through border surveillance operations coordinated by the EU 
border agency, Frontex.
29
 The current Frontex operation in the Central Mediter-
ranean is Operation Triton, which was launched in 2014 to replace the more ef-
fective Italian-led search-and-rescue operation, Operation Mare Nostrum.
30
 Tri-
ton retains a search-and-rescue component, although unlike Operation Mare 
Nostrum, its primary focus is border management.
31
 
B. Human Rights at Stake 
The Operation Sophia territorial sea component risks violating fundamental 
international human rights protected by various international conventions.
32
 
These include, in particular, the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and 
the 1951 Refugee Convention.
33
 The states of the European Union are parties to 
 
29. EU Operations in the Mediterranean, supra note 8. 
30. See Jean-Pierre Gauci & Patricia Mallia, The Migrant Smuggling Protocol and the Need for a 
Multi-faceted Approach: Inter-sectionality and Multi-actor Cooperation, in ‘BOAT REFUGEES’ AND 
MIGRANTS AT SEA: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: INTEGRATING MARITIME SECURITY WITH 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 119, 140-41; Itamar Mann, Killing by Omission, EJIL:TALK! 
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/killing-by-omission [http://perma.cc/VZZ5 
-YSM2]. 
31. See Gauci & Mallia, supra note 30; Mann, supra note 30. 
32. While this Comment focuses speciﬁcally on the Operation Sophia territorial sea component, 
the high seas component of the Operation—in particular Resolution 2240—has been identi-
ﬁed as presenting human rights concerns as well. This Comment focuses on the territorial sea 
component because it raises a distinct set of policy and jurisprudential issues due to the col-
laboration with the Libyans and the fact that activity is occurring in the territory of another 
state. To the author’s knowledge, EUNAVFOR MED has not pushed back to Libya migrants 
encountered on the high seas. Nevertheless, some of the use of force concerns mentioned in 
Section I.B are likely applicable to the high seas component in addition to the broader policy 
critiques outlined in the Comment. 
33. Other early commentaries have provided a more thorough detailing of the human rights im-
plicated by the Operation. See, e.g., Melanie Fink, Protecting Europe or Irregular Migrants?: The 
(Mis)use of Force in the Mediterranean, EJIL:TALK! (May 15, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk
.org/protecting-europe-or-irregular-migrants-the-misuse-of-force-in-the-mediterranean 
[http://perma.cc/QL44-GJHC]; Julian Lehmann, The Use of Force Against People Smugglers: 
Conﬂicts with Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, EJIL:TALK! (June 22, 2015), http://www
.ejiltalk.org/the-use-of-force-against-people-smugglers-conﬂicts-with-refugee-law-and 
-human-rights-law [http://perma.cc/Y28C-RDUD]; Sergo Mananashvili, The Legal and Po-
litical Feasibility of the EU’s Planned ‘War on Smuggling’ in Libya, EJIL:TALK! (June 10,  
2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-legal-and-political-feasibility-of-the-eus-planned-war 
-on-smuggling-in-libya [http://perma.cc/KZZ9-M85Y]. 
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The Operation Sophia territorial sea component is at odds with the principle 
of nonrefoulement, which holds that an individual may not be returned to a place 
where he or she faces risk of persecution.
35
 The nonrefoulement principle is af-
ﬁrmed most clearly in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and is also binding 
upon European states under the ECHR.
36
 The ECtHR has also repeatedly clari-
ﬁed that despite the absence of an explicit nonrefoulement provision in the ECHR, 
such a prohibition was “already inherent in the general terms of article 3.”
37
 Ad-
ditionally, the duty of nonrefoulement now arguably is customary international 
law,
38
 and the overwhelming weight of international authority holds that states 




Libya remains a place of possible persecution for the irregular migrants who 
seek to leave it. In Libya, migrants face possible torture, arbitrary detention, and 
other abuses.
40
 Because Operation Sophia engagements seek to ensure that mi-
 
34. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 339. 
35. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion]. 
36. Id. 
37. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 88 (1989); see 
also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur.-II Ct. H.R. 37, ¶¶ 113-14. 
38. Compare GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 
(3d ed. 2007) (describing the principle of nonrefoulement as “embedded in customary interna-
tional law”), and U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Re-
foulement, REFWORLD (Nov. 1997), http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html [http://
perma.cc/KHD8-5A5U], with JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 365 (2005) (observing that nonrefoulement is not customary international law). 
39. According to the 1967 Protocol accompanying the Refugee Convention, Article 33 “shall be 
applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation.” Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ 3, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see, e.g GOODWIN-GILL & 
MCADAM, supra note 38, at 245-50; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, REFWORLD (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www 
.refworld.org/pdﬁd/45f17a1a4.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BMP-ADL9]. 
40. See, e.g., Judith Sunderland, Why Cooperating with Libya on Migration Could Damage the EU’s 
Standing, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/07 
/why-cooperating-libya-migration-could-damage-eus-standing [http://perma.cc/M4NA 
-K46K]; ‘Libya is Full of Cruelty,’ AMNESTY INT’L 6 (2015), http://www.amnesty.eu/content
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grant vessels cannot leave Libya’s coast, interception and diversion of vessels con-
taining migrants and refugees imply that they may be forced to return to Libya.
41
 
In addition, the program of disposing of vessels used for smuggling may present 
nonrefoulement concerns, as these actions effectively ensure migrants seeking 
transportation cannot leave Libya. For similar reasons, territorial sea engage-
ments may run up against the prohibition against collective expulsion. Affirmed 
in Article 4 of the Protocol 4 of the ECHR, collective expulsion is “any meas-
ure . . . compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except where such a 
measure is taken after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination 
of the particular cases of each individual alien of the group.”
42
 
In addition, because Operation Sophia involves the use of lethal force in the 
proximity of migrants, Operation Sophia’s territorial sea component risks vio-
lating the right to life if force is used recklessly.
43
 Under Article 6 of the ICCPR
44
 
and Article 2 of the ECHR,
 45
 an individual may not be arbitrarily deprived of his 
or her right to life. In using force during seizure and disposal of smuggling ves-
sels, it is possible that force will be inadvertently directed at migrants. An inter-
nal EU document regarding EUNAVFOR MED produced in May 2015 speciﬁ-
cally warned that “non-compliant boarding operations against smugglers in the 
presence of migrants has a high risk of collateral damage including the loss of 
life.”
46
 Of great concern, as documented by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, is that the Libyan Coastguard has historically employed overly 
aggressive and inhumane tactics in managing migration and using force in its 
territorial sea.
47




41. Sunderland, supra note 40 (describing how migrants intercepted or rescued by the Libyan 
Coastguard are sent back to detention centers in poor conditions, with little prospect of legal 
recourse); Wintour, supra note 26 (same). 
42. Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, Nov. 16, 1963, 46 Eur. T.S. 
43. See Papastavridis, supra note 15, at 66 (2016) (“[E]ven though ‘due regard precautions’ have 
been included [in the Rules of Engagement], the idea that electronic warfare or even that the 
minimum use of force is permitted against a boat full of migrants is at least alarming.” (foot-
note omitted)); Lehmann, supra note 33. 
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
45. European Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
46. Andrew Rettman, EU To Expand Mediterranean Anti-Smuggler Force, EU OBSERVER (Sept. 14, 
2015), http://euobserver.com/justice/130258 [http://perma.cc/L2WN-H8XC]. 
47. EU Risks Fuelling Horriﬁc Abuse of Refugees and Migrants in Libya, AMNESTY INT’L (June 14, 
2016), http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eu-risks-fuelling-horriﬁc-abuse 
-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya [http://perma.cc/797F-TYF7]; Sunderland, supra note 
40. 
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Libyan Coastguard unit recklessly boarded a migrant vessel, causing four mi-
grants to drown, and beat other migrants with a stick.
48
 
i i .  gaps in protection: finding human rights jurisdiction 
in libya’s territorial sea  
At the same time that the territorial sea component presents many human 
rights risks, the protections of human rights law may not apply to migrants im-
pacted by the Operation. To trace this gap within the current human rights 
framework, this Part examines three main jurisdictional avenues by which Eu-
ropean states could be held responsible for violations in Libya’s territorial sea and 
argues that their application is uncertain at best. As the ECtHR remains the most 
active human rights enforcement body in Europe, this Section will focus in par-





48. Ahmed Elumami, Libya Naval Forces Deny Charges of Attack on Migrant Boat, REUTERS (Oct. 
22, 2016, 6:33 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUS
KCN12M067 [http://perma.cc/8JAA-B5EE]. For similar reports, see Lizzie Deardon, British 
Government Continues Support for Libyan Coastguard Despite Refugee ‘Killings’ and Attacks on 
Rescue Ships, INDEP. (Jan. 18, 2017, 12:00 AM GMT), http://www.independent.co.uk/news
/uk/home-news/refugee-crisis-libya-coastguard-uk-british-government-support-killing-
shooting-rescue-ship-attacks-a7512071.html [http://perma.cc/45FD-CAVD]; and Karlos 
Zurutuza, Europe’s Libyan Gamble, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2017, 4:01 AM CET), http:// 
www.politico.eu/article/europes-libyan-gamble-coast-guard-migration-refugees [http://
perma.cc/5EVS-PJW8]. 
49. This Comment focuses on gaps in protection under the ECHR, based on ECtHR jurispru-
dence. It should be mentioned that the United Nations Committee Against Torture has heard 
a small number of cases involving migrants at sea and has applied the effective control stand-
ard to support ﬁndings of violations. See Fatou Sonko v. Spain, CAT/C/47/D/368/2008 
(Committee Against Torture Nov. 25, 2011); J.H.A v. Spain, CAT/C/41/D/323/2007 (Com-
mittee Against Torture Nov. 21, 2008); Kees Wouters & Maarten den Heijer, The Marine I 
Case: A Comment, 22 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1 (2009). The jurisdictional gaps under the ECHR—
even if obligations under other instruments may be found to be applicable—contribute to the 
“fragmentation” of human rights obligations at sea, a situation which allows states to comply 
with the least stringent interpretation of their obligations or avert responsibility by claiming 
that other states are under the relevant obligation. See, e.g., Moreno-Lax, supra note 7. 
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A. Effective Control: Applying Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy to the Territorial Sea 
Component 
Human rights obligations are “essentially territorial”
50
 in application. When 
acting extraterritorially, states are bound to secure the rights and freedoms pro-
vided by international human rights law only to those individuals under the 
state’s jurisdiction.
51
 As affirmed in Article 1 of the ECHR, “The High Contract-
ing Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and free-
doms . . . of this Convention.”
52
 
Whether a state possesses extraterritorial jurisdiction—and therefore human 
rights responsibility—is a factual analysis based on the level of a state’s effective 
control over the relevant foreign person or territory.
53
 On multiple occasions, the 
ECtHR Grand Chamber has applied the effective control test in the maritime 
context to determine whether a European state possesses jurisdiction over per-
sons whom the state encountered extraterritorially.
54
 In these cases, the existence 
of effective control depended on the level of physical control the European state 
had over the individuals themselves or their vessels.
55
 
However, in cooperating with the Libyan Coastguard, the EU operates in a 
legal grey area—a situation where the application of European human rights law 
is nonexistent at worst, and uncertain at best.
56
 The ECtHR’s most robust and 
 
50. See Banković v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, ¶¶ 61, 67. 
51. Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur.-II Ct. H.R. 37, ¶¶ 70-71; Soering v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 86 (1989). 
52. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 45, art. 1,  213 U.N.T.S. at 224. 
53. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, ¶¶ 130-49 (2011); 
Bankovic ́, App. No. 52207/99, ¶¶ 70-71. See generally MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 118-66 (2011) (dis-
cussing generally the effective control test and both the personal and territorial models of ju-
risdiction). 
54. See Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, ¶¶ 66-67, 81; Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, 
2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶ 67. 
55. See Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, ¶¶ 66-67, 81; Medvedyev, App. No. 3394/03, ¶ 67; Gam-
meltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 263 (noting the “emphasis being placed in such 
cases on the de facto control exercised over the individuals concerned”). On the importance of 
Hirsi Jamaa, see, for example, Maarten den Heijer, Reﬂections on Refoulement and Collective 
Expulsion in the Hirsi Case, 25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 265 (2013); and Irini Papanicolopulu, Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights—Article 3—Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment—For-
cible Repatriation of Asylum Seekers—Collective Expulsion—Right to a Remedy, 107 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 417 (2013). 
56. This Comment speciﬁcally considers accountability under the ECHR for individual EU mem-
ber states in Operation Sophia, as opposed to the accountability of the EU itself. The EU is 
not a party to the ECHR, and the attribution of EUNAVFOR conduct to individual member 
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factually relevant instruction regarding the conditions under which effective 
control is established at sea comes from the 2012 landmark case of Hirsi Jamaa v. 
Italy, which also concerned migrants leaving Libya.
57
 The Hirsi applicants were 
eleven Somali and thirteen Eritrean nationals who were part of a 200-person 
group that left Libya on three vessels and then were intercepted by Italian coastal 
authorities on the high seas.
 58
 The Italian Coastguard ultimately brought the 
migrants back to Libya, violating both nonrefoulement and the prohibition on col-
lective expulsion.
59
 In intercepting the migrant vessel, Italy was acting pursuant 
to a bilateral cooperation agreement signed with Libya.
60
 Similar to Operation 
Sophia, Italy agreed to support Libyan personnel and engage in maritime patrols 
with crews from both countries.
61
 
In Hirsi, the ECtHR pronounced that the interception and return of the mi-
grant vessels established effective control (and thus de facto jurisdiction).
62
 To 
ﬁnd “effective control,” the Grand Chamber looked at the location of the mi-
grants and the length of time in which the migrants were subject to Italian con-
trol, in addition to the national composition of the crew. The emphasis on loca-
tion and time is consonant with the Grand Chamber’s approach in its prior 
leading extraterritorial maritime case, Medvedyev v. France.
63
 In Hirsi, the Grand 
Chamber speciﬁcally observed that “the events [causing the human rights 
abuses] took place entirely on board ships of the Italian armed forces.”
64
 The 
migrants whose rights were violated had been physically placed on the Italian 
vessels themselves.
65
 In addition, the Grand Chamber underscored the “contin-
uous” nature of the interaction,
66
 citing to Medvedyev in which “uninterrupted 




states remains unresolved, and may itself present an accountability problem. See Efthymios 
Papastavridis, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta off Somalia: The EU in Unchartered Legal Wa-
ters? 64 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 533, 551-68 (2015). 
57. See generally Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 138, 186. 
60. Id. ¶¶ 13, 19-20. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. ¶¶ 9-14, 81-82. 
63. App. No. 3394/03, 2010-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, ¶¶ 66-67. 
64. Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, ¶ 81. 
65. Id. ¶¶ 11, 64. 
66. See id. ¶ 81. 
67. See id. ¶ 80 (citing Medvedyev, App. No. 3394/03, ¶ 67). In Medvedyev, the applicants were not 
placed on the French vessels themselves, but rather the French commando team possessed 
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EUNAVFOR MED’s collaboration with the Libyan Coastguard positions 
European states to take advantage of critical limits in the Court’s reasoning. In 
the current training and funding stage of the territorial sea component, effective 
control under Hirsi would not help trigger human rights jurisdiction, and thus 
responsibility for European states, because European personnel and vessels are 
not themselves exerting any direct physical control, for any length of time, over 
migrant persons. Should Phase 2B proceed, operational coordination with the 
Libyan military provides European states with a great deal of leeway. The Hirsi 
Court provided no broad guidelines as to when control would be established.
69
 
Instead, the Grand Chamber’s strong emphasis on the location of the migrants 
and uninterrupted length of time provides a holding that can be interpreted nar-
rowly. At least one report indicates that the Phase 2B plan involves European 
states turning back vessels to Libya without taking migrants on board.
70 
In joint 
patrols, European states could likewise easily avoid uninterrupted control over 
individual migrant persons. For instance, European vessels could assist in, or 
command, engagements in which the Libyan Coastguard retains physical con-
trol over the migrants on nearby Libyan vessels for all or a signiﬁcant portion of 
the relevant time. 
Perhaps of greatest signiﬁcance, in a critical paragraph justifying its conclu-
sion, the Grand Chamber underscored that the particular crew engaging in the 
prohibited acts in question was “exclusively” Italian.
71
 A crew that is predomi-
nantly composed of Libyan coastal forces would certainly fail to meet this high 
threshold. If in Phase 2B, European states organize operations, as they have in 
the past, to involve a crew of mixed Libyan and European personnel (for in-
stance, European officers stationed on Libyan-ﬂagged vessels), the strong em-
phasis on exclusivity suggests that jurisdiction would remain uncertain. By out-
sourcing the potentially violative activities, European states may avoid attaining 
 
“exclusive” control over the vessel in which the team conﬁned the applicants for thirteen days. 
Medvedyev, App. No. 3394/03, ¶ 66. 
68. Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, ¶¶ 66, 81. 
69. Accord den Heijer, supra note 55, at 273 (“The Court, however, does not give further indications 
as to the wider issue of what intensity of control, or form of state activity, is required for sat-
isfying the jurisdiction requirement under Article 1 of the Convention.”). 
70. Tim Harman, Brieﬁng on Operation Sophia, QUAKER COUNCIL FOR EUR. AFF. ¶ 3.5 (May 9, 
2016), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jun/eu-brieﬁng-operation-sophia-QCEA
.pdf [http://perma.cc/F99B-JG56]; Stephen, supra note 28. 
71. Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, ¶ 81. 
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a sufficient level of “continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control”
72
 to 
trigger human rights obligations. 
B. Attribution and the Territorial Model of Jurisdiction 
While the Hirsi case offers the most factually relevant precedent for estab-
lishing jurisdiction over migrants impacted in Operation Sophia, there are other 
routes to jurisdiction. Human rights jurisdiction under Article 1 has been ex-
tended in military operations in two circumstances relevant to the territorial seas 
component (and which the Court itself has conﬂated in its case law): through 
the attribution of acts conducted by other entities to the European state or 
through the state’s military control over territory abroad.
73
 This case law would 
initially seem to be relevant because unlike in Hirsi and Medvedyev, European 
states are operating with military means in Libyan territory, as opposed to on the 
high seas. In the context of Operation Sophia, however, neither of these theories 
provides a solid jurisdictional trigger, furthering the protection gaps and room 
for discretionary state conduct left by the Court’s maritime cases. 
Based on its current jurisprudence, the ECtHR would need to embrace a 
lenient interpretation of the circumstances warranting attribution to hold Eu-
ropean states accountable for actions taken by the Libyan Coastguard in the 
current training operation. In Ilascu v. Moldova & Russia before the Grand 
Chamber, the Court attributed the unlawful acts of Russian separatists to Rus-
sia.
74
 However, this ﬁnding hinged on Russia’s military and political contribu-
tions to the “creation of a separatist regime” and the “participation of its [own] 
military personnel in the ﬁghting” on Moldovan territory.
75
 Similarly, the EC-
tHR has attributed the acts of the Turkish occupying entity in Cyprus, the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), to Turkey,
76
 but has underscored 
that the TRNC could only “survive[] by virtue of Turkish military and other 
 
72. Id.  
73. In leading cases, the ECtHR has conﬂated attribution with the territorial model of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction in a confusing manner. See MILANOVIC, supra note 53; Marko Milanovic, 
Jurisdiction, Attribution and Responsibility in Jaloud, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www
.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-responsibility-in-jaloud [http://perma.cc/GH53 
-R497].  
74. Ilascu v. Moldova & Russia, App. No. 48787/99, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 89, ¶ 382. 
75. Id. 
76. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 77; Loizidou v. Turkey, Pre-
liminary Objections Decision, App. No. 15318/89, ¶ 60-64, Eur. Reports 1996-VI (Dec. 18, 
1996). 




 By contrast, the Libyan Coastguard can clearly function inde-
pendently of EU financial and logistical support. Indeed, the EU expressly 
aims to promote the Libyan government’s own ability to manage its coastline.
78
 
In addition, in the present training operation, unlike these leading cases, no 
EUNAVFOR MED personnel are present in Libya’s territorial sea. 
If European states proceed with the Phase 2B operation (the entrance of Eu-
ropean vessels and officers themselves into Libyan waters), the presence of Eu-
ropean military assets in foreign territory also raises the possibility of human 
rights jurisdiction based on effective territorial control. While physical control 
over migrant persons has served as the operative standard to date in the Court’s 
maritime case law,
79
 ECHR protections may also apply when a European state 
exercises control over territory and some of the “public powers” normally exer-
cised by the host country.
80
 
For conduct of the Libyan Coastguard in Phase 2B, however, the territorial 
model does not easily provide a basis for European state responsibility. The 
threshold for territorial control is very high. Cases in which the ECtHR has 
found jurisdiction over territory have involved military control and inﬂuence 
akin to a military occupation and administration, with many thousands of 
troops.
81
 While a conclusive determination is difficult without further detail on 
 
77. Cyprus, App. No. 25781/94, ¶ 77. 
78. Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Nov. 2016), supra note 10, at 22-23. 
79. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
80. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011). In Al-Skeini, 
during the course of the Coalition’s occupation of Iraqi territory, the Court established juris-
diction by looking at the combination of control over the detained persons in addition to the 
fact that “the United Kingdom (together with the United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise 
of some of the public powers normally to be exercised by a sovereign government.” Id. (empha-
sis added). Not only does the meaning of the phrase “public powers” remain unclear, but the 
Court’s reasoning in Al Skeini suggests that public powers may need to be exercised in con-
junction with either personal or territorial control, neither of which easily apply to conduct of 
the Libyan Coastguard during Operation Sophia, as outlined supra in Sections II.A and II.B. 
See Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 130-31 
(2012) (observing that in Al-Skeini, “had the UK not exercised such public powers, the per-
sonal model of jurisdiction would not have applied” and the “reasoning extends only to situ-
ations where the state using force exercises some kind of ‘public powers,’ whatever these may 
be”). 
81. See, e.g., Chiragov & Others v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 168-87 
(2015); Catan & Others v. Moldova. & Russia, App. Nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 & 18454/06, 2012-
V Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 103-15 (2012); Al-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 139 (“In determining 
whether effective control exists, the Court will primarily have reference to the strength of the 
State’s military presence in the area . . . . Other indicators may also be relevant, such as the 
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the extent of EUNAVFOR MED deployment, the deployment of EUNAVFOR 
MED vessels and/or officers does not easily resemble an occupation in the num-
bers suggested by the high seas component. Importantly, the fact that the Libyan 
Coastguard will be a major actor in Phase 2B may also present an obstacle to 
jurisdiction under the territorial approach: the Court ﬁnds an extraterritorial ju-
risdictional link when the government of the “occupied” state does not exert con-
trol over the relevant area.
82
 Moreover, uncertainty remains regarding what “ef-
fective territorial control” would actually look like in the marine context, as the 
Court’s cases in this regard have all been terrestrial.
83
 For potentially violative 
activities conducted by EUNAVFOR MED personnel themselves (or a mixed 
crew that perhaps is commanded by a EUNAVFOR MED officer), the Court’s 
recent willingness in cases—notably Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom
84
—to look at 
physical control over persons in conjunction with territorial control may help pro-
vide a more promising basis for jurisdiction.
85
 In those situations, jurisdiction 
would be highly fact-speciﬁc and depend in large part on the degree of physical 
control exercised by the EUNAVFOR MED personnel and vessel,
86
 thus impli-
cating the jurisdictional holes within the extraterritorial maritime jurisprudence 
discussed in Section II.A. 
 
extent to which its military, economic and political support for the local subordinate admin-
istration provides it with inﬂuence and control over the region.”); Cyprus, App. No. 25781/94, 
¶¶ 13-16. 
82. See, e.g., Al-Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, ¶¶ 149-50; Cyprus, App. No. 25781/94, ¶¶ 16-17; see 
also Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 261-62 (“[T]he traditional territorial 
view of jurisdiction is, however, likely of little immediate value in contesting the new genera-
tion of cooperation-based non-entrée practices. Not only has the case law thus far focused 
only on obligations arising from military occupation, but to date there is no instance of non-
entrée being implemented by way of the transfer of durable and exclusive control over terri-
tory.”). 
83. Accord Martin Faix, Application of Human Rights to European Union Military Operations: Mission 
Impossible?, SLOVAK J. INT’L L. 28, 43 (2013) (articulating a similar argument regarding the 
difficulty in applying the territorial model of jurisdiction to the high seas). 
84. Al Skeini, App. No. 55721/07, ¶¶ 130-50.  
85. See Milanovic, supra note 80, at 131 (describing the Court’s approach as a “mix of the personal 
model with the spatial one”). This approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction seems to have been 
employed in Jaloud v. Netherlands. In Jaloud, the Court’s ﬁnding of jurisdiction appeared to 
depend on the combination of the applicant’s presence within an area in which Dutch troops 
had assumed security responsibilities (the territorial component) and the fact that the acts 
occurred at a particular security checkpoint under Dutch command (the personal control com-
ponent). See Jaloud v. Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 149-53 (2014). 
86. Judgments that could be potentially helpful in establishing jurisdiction for harmful activities 
conducted by EUNAVFOR MED crew include Andreou v. Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, 2009 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25 (2009) (applicant fell under Turkey’s jurisdiction based on the “opening of 
ﬁre on the crowd from close range”); Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, App. No. 
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C. European Accountability Based on Theories of Derived Responsibility and 
Joint Conduct 
Finally, accountability for European states involved in Operation Sophia 
could be based on principles of shared responsibility, including derived respon-
sibility and responsibility for joint conduct. Under a theory of derived responsi-
bility, a state may be held responsible for the acts of another state if it aided or 
assisted in the commission of the internationally wrongful act, directed or con-
trolled the commission of the act, or coerced another state into committing the 
wrongful act.
87
 However, the Court’s limited and obscure treatment of these is-
sues further contributes to the ambiguous nature of the legal waters in which 
European states operate—with respect to both the current training operation and 
the prospective Phase 2B. 
Finding European responsibility based on its equipping and training of the 
Libyan Coastguard would require pushing the bounds of current ECtHR law. 
The ECtHR has never expressly relied upon the notion of derived responsibility 
to hold a state accountable.
88
 In its case law, the Court does not expressly refer 
to the rules of state responsibility expressed in Articles 16-18 of the International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility to support a 
ﬁnding of a violation.
89
 The potentially relevant cases that do exist cast doubt on 
whether actions taken by the Libyan Coastguard could be attributed to European 
states. In Karalyos v. Hungary, the violation (unduly lengthy proceedings in a 
civil action) occurred in Hungarian territory, but Greek authorities contributed 
signiﬁcantly to the circumstances amounting to the violation.
90
 The Court held 
that Greece’s responsibility was not “a subject matter” before the Court, instead 
 
31276/05, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (a non-extraterritorial maritime case in which the Con-
vention was found applicable during the Portuguese vessel’s interception of another vessel in 
Portugal’s territorial sea, ostensibly without boarding).   
87. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with Commentaries, arts. 16-18, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 65-70 (2001) [hereinafter Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility]. 
88. Maarten den Heijer, Issues of Shared Responsibility Before the European Court of Human Rights 
26 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int’l Law, Research Paper No. 2012-04, 2012). 
89. Id. To the author’s knowledge based on a review of cases and commentary since 2012, this 
conclusion remains valid. The Court has referred to Article 16 in identifying “Relevant Inter-
national Law” at the beginning of its judgments, although it has not directly applied the Ar-
ticle in its reasoning. See El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39639/09, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶ 97 (2012); Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, App. No. 7511/13, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 201 
(2014). 
90. Karalyos v. Hungary, App. No. 75116/01, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 13-17, 21-23 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Apr. 6, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61693 [http://perma.cc/R66W-ES4W]. 
the yale law journal 126:2421  2017 
2438 
focusing on the liability of the primary actor, Hungary.
91
 As Maarten den Heijer 
has persuasively articulated, it is unsatisfactory that the Court did not engage in 
an analysis regarding Greece’s protective duties under an “aid and assistance” 
paradigm.
92
 The Court could have questioned whether “the Greek authorities 
were aware of the duration of the proceedings” and “whether their failure to pro-
vide information contributed signiﬁcantly to the delay of proceedings.”
93
 
In one of the few decisions by any international human rights body regard-
ing the “aid and assistance” of a foreign government with a poor human rights 
record, the European Commission also did not signal that it would be receptive 
to the kind of reasoning that would be necessary to consider a European state 
responsible for reckless or otherwise harmful actions of the Libyan Coastguard. 
In Tugar v. Italy, a mine clearer in Iraq stepped on a mine that the Iraqi govern-
ment had laid, but which it had illegally bought from an Italian company.
94
 
However, according to the European Commission, the case against Italy for fail-
ing to regulate the arms trade was ultimately inadmissible because of the lack of 
an “immediate relationship” between the Italian supply of mines and the actions 
of the Iraqi authorities.
95
 Thus, so long as European states can show that the 
Libyan Coastguard’s conduct constituted the violation’s direct cause,
96
 European 
responsibility may not be engaged for providing support—such as equipment or 
training—that may have contributed to the violation.
97
 
In Phase 2B, the act of participation in a joint operation with the Libyan 
Coastguard would not itself trigger responsibility for actions taken by the Libyan 
Coastguard. The Court has yet to pronounce a clear statement regarding “joint 
conduct” (when two militaries act in concert), in situations distinct from the 
occupation cases described above.
98
 In one major case that may be reﬂective of 
an approach applicable to situations in which EU personnel contribute to a vessel 
seizure, diversion to Libya, or disposal that is solely and predominantly carried 
 
91. Id. ¶ 40. 
92. den Heijer, supra note 88, at 28-29. 
93. Id. at 29. 
94. Tugar v. Italy, App. No. 22869/93, Eur. H.R. Rep. (1995). 
95. See id. 
96. Id. 
97. The fact that EUNAVFOR officials decline to comment on how their coordination efforts ad-
dress the salient fact that the Libyan Coastguard lacks a clear command structure may be in-
dicative of the potential difficulty in demonstrating the existence of a close relationship be-
tween EUNAVFOR activity and speciﬁc instances of harmful conduct by the Libyan 
Coastguard. See Zurutuza, supra note 48. 
98. den Heijer, supra note 88, at 23-24. 
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out by Libyan personnel, the Court declined to ﬁnd the United Kingdom re-
sponsible for a violation physically committed by U.S. forces despite the United 
Kingdom’s major role in the overall operation in which the violation occurred.
99
 
The conclusion that contribution to a joint military operation is insufficient to 
trigger responsibility preserves uncertainty as to whether the Hirsi holding could 
be applied to cases where multiple military parties contribute to the activities 
harming the migrant person.
100
 Moreover, the Court has also held in Xhavara v. 
Italy that the existence of a formal maritime interdiction agreement will not itself 
establish the liability of the non-acting party.
101
 This ﬁnding casts doubt on 
whether the current Memorandum of Understanding
102
 between the Libyan 
Coastguard and the EU could itself furnish a basis for European accountability 
for actions taken by the Libyan Coastguard. 
In sum, at the same time that the territorial seas component presents signif-
icant human rights risks, the operation’s design exploits the current boundaries 
on extraterritorial human rights protection. Not only do these protection gaps 
limit the possibility of human rights enforcement in particular instances of re-
foulement to Libya or overly aggressive use of force by the Libyan Coastguard, 
but as the next Part will demonstrate, they comprise the legal foundation for a 
 
99. Hussein v. Albania, App. No. 23276/04, at 4 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 14, 2006), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-72789 [http://perma.cc/56RZ-EPEG]. In the more recent case of Jaloud 
v. Netherlands, the Court did not pronounce on the UK’s jurisdiction with respect to the ac-
tions of Dutch forces with whom the UK was collaborating.  See Jaloud v. Netherlands, App. 
No. 47708/08, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 153 (“The Court has established jurisdiction in respect of 
the Netherlands. It is not called upon to establish whether the United Kingdom, another State 
Party to the Convention, might have exercised concurrent jurisdiction.”).  
100. Moreover, the fact that putative violations will occur in Libya’s territorial sea, as opposed to 
on the high seas or in the territory of a European state, may weigh against jurisdiction under 
the current approach. In El-Masri, the Court found Macedonia responsible because Macedo-
nian authorities had supported officials of another state (the United States) who had directly 
and physically committed the violation (ill treatment of El-Masri). But the Court underscored 
that “the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities” was for acts committed on its own 
territory. El-Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39639/09, 2014-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 206 (2012). See 
generally André Nollkaemper, The ECtHR Finds Macedonia Responsible in Connection with Tor-
ture by the CIA, but on What Basis?, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the 
-ecthr-ﬁnds-macedonia-responsible-in-connection-with-torture-by-the-cia-but-on-what 
-basis [http://perma.cc/G7QM-X3FU]. 
101. The Court stated that the “Italian-Albanian Agreement cannot, by itself, engage the respon-
sibility of [Albania] under the Convention for any action taken by Italian authorities in the 
implementation of this agreement.” Xhavara v. Italy & Albania, App. No. 39473/98 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Jan. 11 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115583 [http://perma.cc/R46L 
-WVAR]. For the English translation, see Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 276.  
102. Press Release, EUNAVFOR Signs Agreement, supra note 20. 
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broader policy of militarized border control in tension with human rights prin-
ciples. 
i i i . the policy result: next generation non-entrée 
As described in Part II, European states can make a strong claim that they are 
not responsible for instances of harm to migrants and violation of the nonre-
foulement principle in the territorial sea component because by cooperating with 
the Libyan Coastguard, the putative victims may not formally fall under Euro-
pean human rights jurisdiction. Operation Sophia is thus precisely premised on 
the “schizophrenic”
103
 posture of non-entrée. The territorial seas component re-
ﬂects in particular what Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James Hathaway, 
who coined the concept non-entrée, classify as “next generation” non-entrée: co-
operative practices between wealthy and poor countries through which wealthy 
countries (here, European states) avoid liability by ensuring the human rights 
violations occur under the jurisdiction of a poorer country (here, Libya).
104
 
Ultimately, the territorial sea component of Operation Sophia makes dan-
gerous contributions to the contemporary non-entrée norm. As an especially large 
example of European-African interdiction coordination, and one that expressly 
envisions the use of force, Operation Sophia is a signiﬁcant example of state 
practice weighing in favor of militarized non-entrée. The multiple Council of the 
European Union Decisions justifying Operation Sophia grant legal weight and 
legitimacy to Operation Sophia’s model of militaristic border management.
105
 
The problem, however, is that by holding that the Operation will be imple-
mented in accordance with international human rights law,
106
 the Council of the 
European Union and UNSC mask with a formalist legality a more complex re-
ality in which international responsibility is circumventable due to protection 
gaps in the underlying human rights framework. Should the UNSC provide au-
thorization in the coming months, the UNSC’s legitimization of Phase 2B will 
 
103. Gammeltoft-Hansen & Hathaway, supra note 5, at 241, 248-58. 
104. Id. at 248-57. 
105. See Council Decision 2016/993, supra note 19; Council Decision 2015/778, supra note 9, art. 2. 
106. See S.C. Res. 2312, supra note 14; Council Decision 2015/778, supra note 9, art. 2. UNSC Res-
olution 2312 is the reauthorization of Resolution 2240, which states that anti-smuggling ac-
tivities should be conducted “in full compliance with international human rights law.” S.C. 
Res. 2240, supra note 12, ¶ 10. Resolution 2312 “tak[es] note” of the June 20, 2016 decision 
extending the EUNAVFOR mandate to include training of the Libyan Coastguard and “en-
courages States . . . to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of migrant smuggling 
and human trafficking, in cooperation with Libya.” S.C. Res. 2312, supra note 14, ¶ 4 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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further embolden the norm of next generation non-entrée. In pronouncing the 
legality of certain actions, the UNSC retains a unique “norm creating func-
tion.”
107
 The prospective Resolution would show that it is possible for states to 
receive Chapter VII authorization to use military force in furtherance of mari-
time, as well as next generation, non-entrée. 
In addition to its legal effects, the territorial sea component provides a 
broader policy precedent that should be seriously questioned. While the search-
and-rescue piece of Operation Sophia is certainly laudable, the concept of the 
territorial sea component on the whole straddles a dangerous line between hu-
manitarianism and militarized border control. In a recent interview regarding 
the high seas component of Operation Sophia, a major European politician awk-
wardly admitted that “I think I am right in saying we have turned back about 
200,000 migrants.”
108
 But after hurried prodding by a nearby diplomat, the pol-
itician corrected himself to present the more politically favorable interpretation: 
“Sorry, saved, saved. Thank you. We have saved 200,000 migrants.”
109
 The con-
tention that militarized prevention of entry constitutes a form of “saving” is a 
politically salient justiﬁcation for militarized border control. But in its rhetorical 
salience, the contention perverts the meaning of the time-honored maritime ob-
ligation of rescue at sea
110
 and inappropriately glosses over the actual lived con-
ditions in Libya for those purportedly “saved.” 
Indeed, empirical observations regarding the high seas component of Oper-
ation Sophia undercut the validity of the humanitarian frame. The detention 




107. See, e.g., Rüdiger Wolfrum, Sources of International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. 
INT’L L., ¶ 42 (May 2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690
/law-9780199231690-e1471 [http://perma.cc/QHB3-6FLA]. 
108. Katie Mansﬁeld, ‘Turn Them Back’ Boris Johnson Says Migrant Boats Should Be Sent Straight 
Back to Libya, EXPRESS (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:28 AM), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world
/711131/Boris-Johnson-saysmigrant-boats-should-be-sent-straight-back-to-Libya [http://
perma.cc/K4UY-FK5H] (emphasis added). 
109. Id. (emphasis added). 
110. A conceptually similarly argument has been articulated by the Australian and United States 
governments to justify immigration policies designed to block access to their territories. For 
an insightful discussion of the ethical issues implicated by these arguments, see Itamar Mann, 
Dialectic of Transnationalism: Unauthorized Migration and Human Rights, 1993-2013, 54 HARV. 
J. INT’L L. 315, 374 (2013). 
111. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 40. 
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number of deaths at sea has not decreased since the inception of the Opera-
tion,
112
 and the disposal of smuggling vessels has led smugglers to place mi-
grants on even more hazardous vessels.
113
 Against the background of the EU’s 
response to the Mediterranean crisis more broadly, the purported humanitarian 
motivation may look even less appropriate. Operation Sophia only began after 
European states ceased funding Frontex’s Operation Mare Nostrum, which un-
like the current Frontex Operation Triton, was primarily a search-and-rescue 
mission as opposed to a border operation, with rescue operations extending fur-
ther from Italy’s territorial sea.
114
 
On a case-by-case basis, the non-entrée nature of Operation Sophia implies 
that situations that can and should be evaluated as practically and normatively 
distinguishable from a human rights perspective may be treated equivalently. For 
instance, is the purposeful disposal of a smuggling vessel before it leaves port, 
but with migrants expecting to be smuggled on it, meaningfully different from 
a territorial sea interdiction and subsequent turn-back of migrants to Libya with-
out individual consideration of asylum claims? Should European state responsi-
bility for equipping and training the Libyan Coastguard be different for a situa-
tion in which the Libyan Coastguard turned back migrants who ﬁrst needed to 
be rescued than for a situation in which no rescue attempt was necessary? In 
some scenarios, European states should be accountable for the fulﬁllment of hu-
man rights and refugee obligations. But the result of a non-entrée practice is that 
these distinctions may remain unaddressed. 
 
112. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees observed a more than doubling in the likelihood 
of death on the Mediterranean between 2015 and 2016. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
supra note 1; see also Ingeborg Eliassen, Operation Sophia: Mission Impossible in the Mediterra-
nean, INVESTIGATE EUR. (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/operation 
-sophia-mission-impossible-in-the-mediterranean%E2%80%A8 [http://perma.cc/2S8F 
-6FCW]; EU Policies Put Refugees at Risk: An Agenda To Restore Protectionism, HUM. RTS. 
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-refugees-risk [http://perma.cc/K2JX-SPJV]; Chris Jones, Analysis: The EU’s  
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(Dec. 2016), http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-302-operation-sophia-deterrent-effect
.pdf [http://perma.cc/X42A-6BVA]. 
113. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 1; see also Glenda Garelli & Martina 
Tazzioli, Warfare on the Logistics of Migrant Movements: EU and NATO Military Operations in 
the Mediterranean, OPENDEMOCRACY (June 16, 2016), http://www.opendemocracy.net/medi
terranean-journeys-in-hope/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/warfare-on-logistics-of-mig
rant-movem [http://perma.cc/X726-SNCE]; Jones, supra note 112, at 3-4. 
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iv. strengthening the application of human rights law to 
operation sophia  
Parts II and III of this Comment warned that as a policy matter the territorial 
sea component is best understood as a border-control program that exploits 
short-term protection gaps in the European human rights framework. While 
concerning, the non-entrée aspect does not imply that all antismuggling engage-
ments in the Libyan territorial sea are necessarily unlawful. Rather, this Com-
ment highlights the strong risk that European states create sufficient distance 
between themselves and migrants to avoid being accountable in the ﬁrst instance 
(Part II), and demonstrates that the development overall emboldens a norm that 
runs counter to humanitarian principles (Part III). 
Part IV now discusses recommendations to strengthen human rights law’s 
application to the Operation and restrain the tendency toward militarized extra-
territorial border control. Because states in the territorial sea component may be 
legally positioned to avoid considering the human rights effects of their activi-
ties, it is important at a minimum for European judges and policymakers to 
begin ﬁlling the extant jurisdictional gaps. This Comment in particular calls at-
tention to the need for jurisdictional avenues to address situations of collabora-
tive conduct in the maritime context. Section A of Part VI outlines doctrinal de-
velopments to advance more protective interpretations of jurisdiction in these 
situations. At the same time, a successful solution to the humanitarian crisis in 
the Mediterranean will require policy actions to promote compliance with hu-
man rights standards in the near term. Section B sketches a set of policy pre-
scriptions to help further close the protection and accountability gap.  
A. Toward More Protective Interpretations of Human Rights Jurisdiction 
While gaps and areas of uncertainty remain, the ECtHR has overall em-
braced a functional approach toward extraterritorial jurisdiction.
115
 Just recently, 
in December 2016, the Grand Chamber also reminded states that the human 





115. See, e.g., Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, ¶ 178 (affirming 
that “the special nature of the maritime environment cannot justify an area outside the law 
where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of the 
rights and guarantees protected by the Convention”).  
116. Khlaiﬁa v. Italy, App. No. 16483/12, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 106 (2016). 
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As suggested by the analysis in Part I, for situations of next generation non-
entrée, the “continuous and exclusive” standard for effective control, as applied 
in Hirsi, may be inadequate. To promote human rights protection in a situation 
of next generation non-entrée, the circumstances amounting to physical control 
over a migrant person will need to be broadened. In future maritime cases, the 
Court could consider an interpretation of effective control that hinges on the rel-
ative power of the intercepting vessel over migrant persons.
117 
Instead of looking 
to factors like how many hours the migrants were on a European vessel, the 
Court should emphasize the “physical presence and strength” of the intercepting 
vessel vis-à-vis the migrant as the operative condition establishing control.
118
 
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Tillmann Löhr, and Timo Tohidipur have advanced 
such an interpretation of effective control, according to which diversions and in-
terceptions of “smaller, more vulnerable” vessels trigger human rights responsi-
bility.
119
 While the Court would need to consider limits based on the degree of 
power over the migrant person, the approach overall offers ﬂexibility to expand 
the Hirsi reasoning to situations of collaborative conduct.
120
 
Emphasis on physical power over migrant persons would help close the ex-
isting protection gaps for interdictions conducted by both the Libyan Coast-
guard and EUNAVFOR MED vessels. Under this interpretation, a vessel con-
taining one EU officer, even if the vessel has a Libyan ﬂag, could help establish 
jurisdiction, because EU command and strategy contributes to the relative 
strength of the interdicting vessel. Likewise, Libyan vessels—based on training, 
equipment, logistical support, and funding from the EU—could be regarded as 
relatively “powerful” with respect to a victim migrant. This interpretation also 
 
117. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Tillmann Löhr & Timo Tohidipur, Border Control at Sea: Re-
quirements Under International Human Rights and Refugee Law, 21 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 256, 275-
76 (2009); Natalie Klein, Assessing Australia’s ‘Push Back the Boats’ Policy Under International 
Law: Legality and Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants, 15 MELB. J. INT’L 
L. 414, 422 (2014). 
118. Fischer-Lescano et al., supra note 117, at 275. 
119. Id. at 276. 
120. The Court’s decision in Xhavara v. Italy could also be interpreted in a manner that supports 
this power-based interpretation of “control.” Most maritime and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
cases establish effective control due to the lengthy detention of migrants in a European vessel 
or facility. By contrast, in Xhavara, the ECtHR did not question whether Italy possessed ju-
risdiction over migrants who drowned due to the accidental collision of the Italian vessel and 
an Albanian patrol boat carrying Albanian migrants. The relative strength and size (i.e., 
power) of the Italian warship operating as part of a naval blockade could be viewed as having 
been disproportionate to the threat presented by the risk of unauthorized migration by the 
applicants, helping establish jurisdiction. See Xhavara v. It. & Alb., App. No. 39473/98 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Jan. 11 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115583 [http://perma.cc/R46L 
-WVAR]. 
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draws support from the ECtHR’s emphasis in Al-Skeini and Others v. United 
Kingdom that the “exercise of physical power and control over the person in ques-
tion” can furnish extraterritorial jurisdiction.
121
 
In addition to this power-based theory, the Court could embrace a jurisdic-
tional theory based more expressly on Article 16 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, which provides for responsibility based on aiding or assist-
ing an internationally wrongful act.
122
 While to date Article 16 has not ﬁgured 
prominently in the Court’s case law, an “aiding and assisting” theory offers an 
important jurisprudential means to ensure European responsibility in situations 
of cooperative non-entrée.
123
 Under the standard maintained by the International 
Court of Justice, attribution of the internationally wrongful act to the assisting 
state requires evidence of the assisting state’s control over the discrete opera-
tional engagement in which the alleged violations occurred.
124
 But the ECtHR 
can consider articulating a broader interpretation of operational direction ac-
cording to which particular levels of military and training assistance combined 
with knowledge of the circumstances in which they may unlawfully be used, 
helps trigger jurisdiction and thus human rights duties in foreign territory.
125
 
Indeed, the territorial sea component may reﬂect the need to expand jurisdiction 
for the acts of non-European states, supported and encouraged by European 
states, in extraterritorial military situations that do not rise to the level of occu-
pation. In practice, the potential for liability under an “aid and assist” paradigm 
could oblige EUNAVFOR MED to consider the risk of refoulement in individual 
anti-smuggling engagements, regulate provision of equipment to ensure they do 
not end up in the hands of un-vetted Coastguard units, and require that the Lib-
yan Coastguard incorporate processes for identifying migrants with bona ﬁde 
refugee claims into their interdiction program. The paradigm would also compel 
states to improve the conditions of migrants forced to return to Libya as the EU’s 
level of anti-smuggling support increases. 
 
121. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, ¶¶ 130-49 (2011) 
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In Phase 2B, should EUNAVFOR MED place officers on Libyan vessels or 
engage joint patrols, an embrace of Article 16 will be especially helpful. In a con-
curring opinion in Hirsi, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque rightly pointed to Article 
16 to describe a jurisdictional theory according to which “the presence of an 
agent from a Contracting Party on board a warship of a non-contracting party 
or a navy under the effective control of a non-Contracting Party makes the co-
operating Contracting Party responsible for any breaches of the Convention 
standard.”
126
 While the Judgment itself may not easily lend itself to this inter-
pretation, this reasoning can be used to help overcome the limits of the current 
“continuous and exclusive” effective control standard. 
B. Policy Actions To Embolden the Application of Human Rights Law to 
Operation Sophia 
As the doctrinal developments suggested above crystalize in the case law, 
both the EU and the UNSC can take actions to ameliorate the human rights ac-
countability gap. The EU’s goal of addressing migration closer to the source 
through the territorial sea component is not itself misguided. But smugglers 
should be viewed as symptoms of the political and economic conditions that 
compel individuals to leave their homes in the ﬁrst place. In furtherance of the 
goal of saving lives, therefore, European states must prioritize amelioration of 
the root causes of migration and the prevention of dangerous passage by facili-
tating access to legal and safe migration routes. 
In the immediate term, European states should embrace a more expansive 
view of their human rights obligations by minimizing the risk of refoulement and 
instances of overly aggressive use of force by the Libyan Coastguard. To this end, 
the EU should commit resources to improve the conditions of migrant detention 
facilities in Libya and pressure Libya to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
EUNAVFOR MED should also take affirmative steps to ensure that the human 
rights practices it shares with the officers it vets for training are implemented by 
the Libyan Coastguard as a whole.
127
 Further, EUNAVFOR MED should pro-
vide transparency into the nature of its interaction with the Libyan Coastguard 
in order to ensure that the private nature of collaborative agreements does not 
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127. On the vetting of trainees, see Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Nov. 2016), supra note 10, 
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foreclose future enforcement of human rights obligations,
128
 in particular by the 
ECtHR. 
Should Phase 2B proceed, the UNSC’s authorization of Phase 2B risks fur-
ther emboldening the militarized approach to migration advanced by Operation 
Sophia, and so constraints must be considered. Current discourse reveals that 
the UNSC will rely on the series of Resolutions authorizing EUNAVFOR MED 
to enter Somalia’s territorial sea to combat piracy and armed robbery (Operation 
Atalanta) as the legal blueprint for the prospective Phase 2B Resolution.
129
 How-
ever, while the Atalanta resolutions may serve as an appropriate precedential ba-
sis for a policy of law enforcement in a foreign state’s territorial sea, this framing 
should not overshadow an underlying distinction: the effort to ﬁght smuggling, 
unlike piracy, is a policy directed at a human rights issue—irregular migration. 
The human rights consequences of vessel seizures, boarding, and disposals 
should be robustly reﬂected in the Chapter VII authorization. When force is used 
against pirate vessels and armed robbers, any aggressive action risks harming 
pirates (suspected criminals). By contrast, force directed against smugglers in 
Operation Sophia engagements present a risk to unarmed migrants, whose pres-
ence in Libya’s territorial sea is not a crime. To limit the prospective territorial 
sea Resolution’s contribution to a customary norm of next generation non-entrée, 
it should underscore its application only “with respect to the situation of migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking . . . off the coast of Libya and [shall] not affect 
the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member states under international 
law.”
130
 In addition, to ameliorate the extant jurisdictional ambiguities, the 
United Nations could specify how to determine which state possesses interna-
tional responsibility when joint patrols and coordinated engagements run afoul 
of the nonrefoulement principle. It could also clarify which particular actions—
such as diversions and disposals—trigger human rights obligations. Whereas 
Resolution 2240 only brieﬂy gestured to international human rights law’s ap-
plicability, the signiﬁcant jurisdictional gaps created by European activities in 
Libyan territory warrant a more detailed articulation of the substantive human 
rights obligations states possess when combatting human smuggling. 
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129. Operation Sophia Six-Monthly Report (Nov. 2016), supra note 10, at 23; see Mananashvili, supra 
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This Comment has argued that the design of the territorial sea component 
unfortunately opens signiﬁcant protection gaps for migrants. Against the global 
rise in extraterritorial police operations with host state consent,
131
 this Com-
ment’s analysis has highlighted one set of ways in which such engagements risk 
circumventing international human rights law. 
In extending anti-smuggling efforts in Libya’s territorial sea, European states 
are positioned to skirt the European human rights accountability framework 
while instigating morally and legally questionable practices. As the Operation 
continues, judges and policymakers must help ensure that European human 
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